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Abstract 
Cognitive metaphor research is characterised by the diversity of rival theories. Starting from 
this observation, the paper focuses on the problem of how the unity and diversity of cognitive 
theories of metaphor can be accounted for. The first part of the paper outlines a suitable 
metascientific approach which emerges as a modification of B. von Eckardt’s notion of 
research framework. In the second part, by the help of this approach, some aspects of the 
sophisticated relationship between Lakoff and Johnson’s, Glucksberg’s, and Gentner’s 
theories are discussed. The main finding is that the data, the problems, the heuristics and the 
hypotheses which have been partly shaped by the rivals contribute to the development of the 
particular theories to a considerable extent. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The data problem currently discussed in several fields of linguistics affects cognitive 
metaphor research as well. We raise it in its simplest form as follows: 
 
(P1) What types of data can be used and how can these types of data be applied in 
cognitive theories of metaphor? 
 
(P1) is a typical metatheoretical problem and should therefore be treated as such. Since the 
thesis of the theory-ladeness of data is one of the few tenets which in one version or other all 
approaches to the philosophy of science seem to accept, it follows that the nature of data in 
cognitive metaphor research cannot be detached from the nature of cognitive theories of 
metaphor. Therefore, the precondition for finding a possible solution to (P1) is to reveal the 
nature of the latter.  
As is well-known, since the 1980s a rich network of alternative approaches to cognitive 
metaphor research has emerged. These theories suggested new solutions to old problems, 
raised new problems and developed new methods of research. Nevertheless, the relationship 
among the elements of this highly complex network is anything but clear. Proponents of a 
certain theory of metaphor either do not reflect on alternative approaches at all, or fiercely 
criticize and reject those (cf. e.g. Leezenberg, 2001; Glucksberg and McGlone, 2001; Jäkel, 
1997; Baldauf, 1997; Haser, 2005; see also Schwarz, 2008, pp. 66-75, Skirl, 2009). 
Consequently, the present state of the art has two main characteristics. On the one hand, cog-
nitive theories of metaphor necessarily have common features, since all of them define them-
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selves as being part of cognitive science. On the other hand, as regards their hypotheses and 
the methods they apply, they are incompatible in several respects. Thus, we face the problem 
of resolving the tension between these two aspects, namely: 
 
(P2) How can we account for the unity and diversity of cognitive theories of metaphor? 
 
The reason why no possible solutions to this problem could be found so far is the lack of an 
appropriate metascientific method which would facilitate investigating the complex and so-
phisticated relationships among cognitive theories of metaphor. This means that (P2) can be 
discussed only if (P3) has been answered:  
 
(P3) Which metatheory can solve (P2)? 
 
We will argue as follows. In Section 2, we will outline a possible solution to (P3). In Section 
3, this metatheory will be applied to (P2). Then, in Section 4 we will infer a possible solution 
to (P1) from our answer to (P2). Finally, our findings will be summarized in Section 5. 
 
 
2. On (P3) 
2.1. Eckardt’s research frameworks and subsidiary research frameworks 
 
Since Kuhn’s The structure of scientific revolutions has been one of the most influential ap-
proaches to the history and philosophy of science, it seems to be a good starting point if we 
want to find a solution to (P3). However, it was argued among others by Barbara von Eckardt 
(1993, 2006) that Kuhn’s approach is not applicable to cognitive science. The reason is that 
while Kuhn’s account is intended to capture “mature” science only, cognitive science is an 
“immature” discipline in Kuhn’s sense. According to Kuhn (1970), the main criterion for the 
maturity of a certain discipline is that it must have at least one paradigm. This means that “a 
Kuhnian paradigm (as well a disciplinary matrix and an exemplar) is either identical to a 
theory, contains a theory as one of its elements or consists in the application of a theory” 
(Eckardt, 1993, p. 373). As opposed to this, “it can be said with confidence that commitment 
to the FSC [framework of shared commitments] of an immature field does not involve 
commitment to some specific set of scientific theories” (Eckardt, 1993, p. 372-373). 
Cognitive science is an immature field in this sense. As Eckardt claims:  
 
“What all cognitive scientists share over the course of time is a commitment to something 
like an approach to the study of mind rather than to some specific set of theories, 
explanations, or laws etc. It is not that the latter do not exist – surely they do. The point 
is, rather, that commitment or loyalty to such theories, explanations, or laws varies from 
research laboratory to research laboratory and from year to year (even from month to 
month). I take it that this feature of cognitive science […] is what makes it an immature 
rather than a mature science. While a science is still immature, the theories that it 
generates are still tentative. They are on probation, so to speak, and they may become 
outmoded and be replaced by a new set of theories in the very near future. Yet when this 
happens the science does not change in an essential way. We do not stop doing cognitive 
science, for example, just because we decide that the specific theories of memory or 
language production that we accepted yesterday are wrong.” (Eckardt, 1993, p. 15; 
emphasis as in the original)  
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Kuhn’s conceptual apparatus is restricted to capturing paradigms, scientific crises signifying 
the decline of paradigms, and scientific revolutions emerging from the crises. It cannot ac-
count for immature disciplines where paradigms have not yet developed, where one finds only 
a diversity of incompatible views on the foundations of the discipline, and a diversity of 
incompatible theories. Therefore, Eckardt suggests that the notion of research framework has 
to be introduced to replace the notion paradigm. According to Eckardt (2006, pp. 123-124), 
“a research framework consists of four sets of elements D, Q, SA, MA, where D is a set of 
assumptions that provide a pre-theoretical specification of the domain under study; Q is a set 
of basic empirical research questions, formulated pre-theoretically; SA is a set of substantive 
assumptions that embody the approach being taken in answering the basic questions and that 
constrain possible answers to those questions; and MA is a set of methodological 
assumptions”. Introducing the notion of ‘research framework’ serves two purposes. First, it 
facilitates the analysis of a certain discipline on a pre-theoretical basis, and as a result of this, 
it captures the common properties of otherwise incompatible theories and captures the unity 
of cognitive science. Second, since it gives up the simplified distinction between “mature” 
and “immature” science, it can account for different phases of the development of disciplines 
by making use of a unified metatheoretical framework. 
According to Eckardt, a scientific community accepts all the elements of a research 
framework and considers them not to be revisable. These irrevisable elements are 
supplemented by further elements, which are either not accepted by the whole of the scientific 
community or are restricted to specific sub-domains. These elements are revisable and 
constitute different subsidiary research frameworks. Therefore, one can explain the evolution 
of research frameworks by following the continuous change of their revisable elements, while 
the irrevisable ones remain unchanged (cf. Eckardt, 1993, p. 377-378). 
Although Eckardt’s suggestion is more flexible than Kuhn’s, at least three reasons can be 
given to show that her proposal is not satisfactory, either. The first difficulty arises from the 
fact that Eckardt’s approach is also one-sided, though not in the same sense as Kuhn’s. 
Whereas Eckardt criticises Kuhn for his theory-centred perspective, she focuses solely on the 
other extreme, namely, on the pre-theoretical characterization of research frameworks. 
However, this is insufficient since one has to define the distinction between theoretical and 
pre-theoretical research in order to retain the pre-theoretical nature of research frameworks in 
cognitive science, something Eckardt fails to do. Second, as the indented quotation above 
shows, while she does not question the existence of theories within cognitive science, she 
does not develop means to describe the relations among these theories. Third, Eckardt herself 
emphasizes that research frameworks determine research only at a very high level of 
abstraction and they usually form only a set of implicit background hypotheses. As opposed 
to this, scientific problem solving presupposes more specific assumptions, methods and 
problems which are beyond the scope of the pre-theoretical nature of research frameworks 
(see e.g. Eckardt, 1993, p. 19-22). 
From these considerations it follows that in order to account both for the unity and the 
diversity of cognitive theories of metaphor one cannot dispense with the characterization of 
the specific properties of theories. How can we carry out this task? 
 
 
2.2. Theoretical frameworks and subsidiary theoretical frameworks 
 
At this stage, there are two possible starting points for our discussion. First, Eckardt accepts 
the view that scientific inquiry is basically a problem solving procedure (cf. Eckardt, 1993, p. 
24). Consequently, the description of scientific theories has to capture basic components of 
problem solving. Second, although different philosophies of science define the notion of 
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theory in different ways, all of them agree on the fact that at least the following components 
closely related to problem solving are theory-dependent: (a) problems, (b) data (“empirical” 
data and background assumptions), (c) heuristics and (d) the results of problem solving, i.e. 
the hypotheses supported by the theory. If different theories define what they consider as 
problems, data, successful heuristics and the result of problem solving in completely different 
ways, then from the properties of these components – irrespective of how the concept theory 
is defined – one can draw certain conclusions concerning the differences among theories 
which otherwise accept the same research framework and subsidiary research framework.  
We introduce the notion theoretical framework to refer to the set {P, DA, H, R} where 
the symbols stand for problems, data, heuristics and results, respectively. In what follows we 
will call the particular stages of problem solving within a theoretical framework subsidiary 
theoretical frameworks. Whereas theoretical frameworks contain elements which are not 
regarded as revisable by the community accepting the theory, subsidiary theoretical 
frameworks include revisable elements as well (in addition to irrevisable ones).  
These notions are intended to capture three important aspects. First, they facilitate 
synchronic comparison of theories belonging to the same research framework (or subsidiary 
research framework); thus, one can find overlapping features, similarities and differences 
among rival theories within a research framework and subsidiary research framework. 
Second, by describing the change of problems, heuristics, data and results one can also 
capture the diachronic process of the evolution of theoretical frameworks. Since scientific 
inquiry is conceived of as problem solving, philosophy and history of science must interpret 
theories in a dynamic manner. Therefore, following Rescher (1976, 1977), theories can be 
viewed as cyclic and prismatic reasoning processes. More specifically, the problems, data, 
heuristics and results at issue are continuously re-evaluated from different points of view 
within subsequent cycles of reasoning (see also Kertész and Rákosi 2009, 2012). The main 
stages of this process are embodied in different subsidiary theoretical frameworks. Third, by 
relating synchronic and diachronic analyses, it is possible to examine the influence which 
rival theories have on one another and to describe the complex relations among theories 
belonging to the same subsidiary research framework. 
 
 
2.3. The solution to (P3) 
 
The above considerations suggest the following solution to (P3): 
 
(H3) (P2) can be solved by a metatheoretical approach consisting of four levels: research 
frameworks, subsidiary research frameworks, theoretical frameworks and subsidiary 
theoretical frameworks. 
 
Obviously, completing the application of (H3) to (P2) lies out of the scope of the present 
paper. Therefore, its workability will only be illustrated by particular features of Lakoff and 
Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor, Glucksberg’s property attribution theory and 
Gentner’s structure mapping theory. We make use of the following terminology. The term 
‘cognitive theories of metaphor’ comprises all three approaches and within the latter, we will 
differentiate particular theories by the name of the authors. Since within Lakoff and Johnson’s 
theory several stages of development – i.e. several subsidiary theoretical frameworks – can be 
differentiated, the term ‘Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor’ will refer to the 
set of these subsidiary theoretical frameworks. See Figure 1 as an illustration of the four 
levels introduced above. 
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Figure 1: The four levels 
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3. On (P2) 
3.1. The research framework of cognitive science and the subsidiary research framework of 
metaphor research 
 
From Eckardt’s model it follows that cognitive science is the research framework of cognitive 
theories of metaphor. Those views whose domain is restricted to metaphor as a cognitive phe-
nomenon form a particular subsidiary research framework. Hence, the unity of different the-
ories of metaphor rests on two factors: the theories belong to the same research framework, 
namely, cognitive science; and, within the latter, they belong to the same subsidiary research 
framework. 
The research framework of cognitive science contains, among others, the following elem-
ents (Eckardt, 2006, pp. 125-126):  
 
Domain-specifying assumptions: The domain consists of human cognitive capacities.  
Basic questions: For a normal, typical adult, what precisely is the human capacity to ____? 
How does a normal, typical adult exercise his or her capacity to ____? 
Substantive assumptions: The human, cognitive mind/brain is a representational device; 
hence, human cognitive capacities consist of a system of representational capacities. A 
representational device is a device that has states or that contains entities that are repre-
sentations.  
Methodological assumptions: Although there is considerable variation in how adult human 
beings exercise their cognitive capacities, adults are sufficiently alike when they cognize. 
Hence, it is meaningful to talk about a “typical” adult cognizer and it is possible to arrive 
at generalizations about cognition that hold (at least approximately) for all normal adults. 
 
The elements constituting the subsidiary research framework of cognitive metaphor research 
can be illustrated by the following examples: 
 
Domain-specifying assumptions: The domain consists of cognitive capacities for using and 
interpreting metaphoric expressions. 
Basic questions: How can the nature of the human capacity which is applied when using and 
interpreting metaphoric expressions be described? What function do metaphors have in 
cognition? How are metaphors mentally represented? What kinds of metaphors are there 
and how do they differ with respect to structure and function? 
Substantive assumptions: Metaphors do not simply form linguistic phenomena, they also have 
a cognitive function.  
Methodological assumptions: Whatever be the characterization of metaphors, they should be 
investigated by using the empirical means of cognitive science. 
 
 
3.2. The three theoretical frameworks 
 
It will be sufficient to exemplify the diversity of theories within the subsidiary research 
framework of metaphor research by highlighting certain elements in the theoretical frame-
works of the three rival approaches which are not accepted by the other two or are held to be 
irrelevant. See tables 1-4. 
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Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive 
theory of metaphor  
Glucksberg’s property attribution 
theory 
Gentner’s structure mapping the-
ory 
What general principles govern the 
interpretation and use of meta-
phoric expressions, if we regard 
metaphors basically as one of the 
mental tools for structuring our ex-
periences?  
Etc. 
How can the psychological process 
of metaphor comprehension be 
characterized, if we regard meta-
phors as a kind of categorization?  
Etc. 
How can the psychological process 
of metaphor comprehension be 
characterized, if we regard meta-
phors as a kind of analogy? 
Etc.  
 
Table 1: Problems 
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cognitive theory of metaphor 
(Lakoff and Johnson) 
property attribution theory 
(Glucksberg) 
structure mapping theory 
(Gentner) 
Thinking and language rest on the 
same conceptual system, i.e. there 
is only one conceptual system 
underlying language and 
reasoning. 
Metaphoric projection is always 
unidirectional. 
There is systematicity among lin-
guistic expressions in connection 
with abstract concepts and they 
build up complex systems. 
Etc. 
 
Metaphors can always be trans-
formed into similes and vice versa: 
metaphoric similes can be trans-
formed into metaphors. In the case 
of literal similes, however, this 
transformation does not work. 
The comprehension time of meta-
phors is influenced by the number 
of the topic’s dimensions, such as 
its salient characteristics and by the 
unambiguity of the vehicle. 
Comprehension of metaphoric ex-
pressions does not take more time 
than that of literal expressions. 
We understand metaphoric expres-
sions faster than metaphoric sim-
iles. 
Etc. 
In neutral contexts the comprehen-
sion of metaphors in some cases 
requires a longer time than that of 
literal expressions. 
Empirical evidence supports the 
claim that literal and metaphoric 
interpretations are processed not 
serially but simultaneously. 
The conventionality of metaphors 
strongly influences the comprehen-
sion time: we interpret conven-
tional figuratives faster than novel 
figuratives. 
There is an interaction between the 
grammatical form and the degree 
of conventionality as well: novel 
similes are interpreted faster than 
novel metaphors, but in the case of 
conventional similes and 
metaphors we obtain the opposite 
result. 
Etc. 
 
Table 2: Data 
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cognitive theory of metaphor 
(Lakoff and Johnson) 
property attribution theory 
(Glucksberg) 
structure mapping theory 
(Gentner) 
Properties of metaphorical con-
cepts can be inferred from 
properties of metaphorical expres-
sions. 
Etc. 
Psycholinguistic experiments. Ex-
amining differences between the 
behaviour of similes and 
metaphors and working out 
possible explanations. 
Etc. 
Psycholinguistic experiments. 
Explanation of differences in com-
prehension times by differentiating 
the concept metaphor and by 
working out a complex processing 
model. 
Etc. 
 
 
Table 3: Heuristics 
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cognitive theory of metaphor 
(Lakoff and Johnson) 
property attribution theory 
(Glucksberg) 
structure mapping theory 
(Gentner) 
Metaphors have explanatory 
power, i.e. they help us understand 
different aspects of abstract con-
cepts. 
The connection between the two 
conceptual domains of metaphoric 
expressions is a unidirectional 
mapping between the source do-
main and the target domain. 
The Invariance Principle: the 
source domain preserves its struc-
ture during the metaphoric map-
ping. 
The conceptual system is meta-
phorically structured. 
Etc. 
Metaphorical expressions are cate-
gorical assertions. The vehicle re-
fers to a superordinate category 
which does not necessarily have a 
representation and a lexeme. 
The vehicle has dual reference: it 
refers to an abstract superordinate 
category that is exemplified by the 
vehicle and to a prototypical mem-
ber of that category, i.e. to the ve-
hicle as understood in its literal 
sense. 
The vehicle provides the property-
candidates which may be attributed 
to the topic; the task of the topic is 
to provide the local context where 
the relevant properties will be se-
lected. 
The selection and matching of the 
relevant properties is an inference 
process. 
Etc. 
We always create manifold alter-
native interpretations (including 
the literal one) and select the most 
appropriate from them on the basis 
of our background knowledge and 
on the basis of the context. 
The alignment of the 
representation of the base and that 
of the target domain is the result of 
a continuous reinterpretation. 
The base and the target domain ful-
fil different functions: the base of-
fers candidate inferences, thus it 
gives new perspectives for the in-
terpretation of the target domain, 
while the latter licenses them.  
Not all metaphoric expressions can 
be captured by one processing 
model. There is a change in the 
comprehension process corres-
ponding to their conventionaliza-
tion and lexicalization; the mode of 
processing shifts gradually from 
interpreting the expression as a 
simile to interpreting it as a cate-
gorical assertion.  
Etc. 
 
Table 4: Results 
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3.3.  The solution to (P2) 
 
The above considerations yield the following hypothesis as the solution to (P2): 
 
(H2) (a) The unity and common features of Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive theory of meta-
phor, Glucksberg’s property attribution theory and Gentner’s structure mapping 
theory are due to the fact that these theories belong to the same research frame-
work, that of cognitive science, and within this, to the same subsidiary 
framework, that of cognitive metaphor research. There is a set of pre-theoretical 
basic questions and assumptions which are accepted by all of the theories in 
question. At the same time, they are associated with different theoretical 
frameworks, and thus the incompatible elements constituting the diversity of this 
scientific field become apparent as well.  
(b) This kind of unity and diversity jointly facilitate continuous and manifold inter-
action among the three theories. The data, the problems, the heuristics, and the 
hypotheses which have been partly shaped by the rivals contribute to their 
development to a considerable extent. 
 
 
4. On (P1) 
4.1 Introductory remarks 
 
Against the background of (H3) and (H2), our starting problem (P1) is to be interpreted in the 
context of what we have called the problems P, the heuristics H applied, the results R 
obtained and the data DA. In particular, in the next subsections we will discuss three 
examples. The first focuses on the connection between the problem of circularity and the data 
types used. The second example sheds light on the complex relationship between heuristics 
related to metaphor processing, experimental data, and the background assumptions. The 
third example highlights the importance of the combination of different data types and 
methods in the increasing of the reliability of the results.  
 
 
4.2. First example: the problem of circularity 
 
One of the main features of the relationship between the theoretical frameworks of cognitive 
metaphor research is that their proponents mutually accuse each other of circularity. These 
charges are directed against different aspects of the rival theories. Consider the following 
cases:  
 
(a) Glucksberg’s Property Attribution Theory (cf. Glucksberg, 2001, 2003) criticises 
Gentner’s Structure Mapping Theory (cf. for example Gentner et al., 2001; Bowdle and 
Gentner, 2005; Gentner and Bowdle, 2001, 2008) as follows:  
 
“Because the number of features that can be attributed in common to any two objects is 
unlimited […], any theory of feature matching must either provide some mechanism for 
extracting subsets of features that are relevant in a given context or simply postulate 
prior feature selection and proceed from there. […] The prior process of extraction and 
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compilation, however, can be nothing other than the interpretation of the comparison 
assertion itself.” (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 30)  
 
(b) Interestingly, the target of the charge formulated by Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive 
theory of metaphor against Property Attribution Theory is the proposed model of 
metaphor processing, too: 
 
“Jobs do not share the qualities that define jails in any literal sense, but only in a sense 
that is already metaphorical. For metaphors of this sort, both ‘superordinate categories’ 
and ‘common properties’ lead to a circular definition, inasmuch as they both rely on 
qualities that pertain to the vehicle literally but to the topic metaphorically. These 
qualities cannot be considered either ‘common’ or ‘category-defining’ until after the 
metaphorical work has already been accomplished.” (Ritchie, 2003, p. 50; emphasis 
added)  
 
(c) The Structural Similarity View (cf. for example Murphy, 1996, p. 179-180) raises the 
problem of circularity in connection with the restricted range of data types taken into 
consideration by Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor: 
 
“[…] the empirical base for the theory must be expanded beyond linguistic phenomena. 
As I pointed out in my analogy to the Whorfian hypothesis, there is a circularity here, 
such that linguistic data are used to identify metaphors, but the main concrete 
predictions the theory makes are about similar linguistic and psycholinguistic data. 
Since the theory is about conceptual representation, the kind of data familiar to 
cognitive psychologists should be predicted as well. That is, predictions about memory, 
problem solving, induction, measures of conceptual structure (such as typicality and 
categorization), learning and performance should become more central to the theory.” 
(Murphy, 1996, p. 200; emphasis added) 
 
The quotations above show that the charge of circularity is a central and relevant problem in 
current debates among adherents of diverse theoretical frameworks within the subsidiary 
research framework of metaphor research. The importance of this problem is due to the fact 
that it is regarded as a fatal failure, but its evaluation is in most cases contentious.  
By way of illustration, let us mention a circularity-charge directed against the first 
subsidiary framework of Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor. Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) contained the heuristics according to which one can infer properties of 
metaphorical concepts from properties of metaphorical expressions. This method was serious-
ly criticized by the Property Attribution Theory:   
 
“[...] Lakoff's claim that metaphors transcend their linguistic manifestations to influence 
conceptual structure rests solely on these manifestations. How do we know that people 
think of theories in terms of buildings? Because people often talk about theories using 
building-related expressions. Why do people often talk about theories using building-
related expressions? Because people think about theories in terms of buildings. Clearly, 
the conceptual metaphor view must go beyond circular reasoning of this sort and seek 
evidence that is independent of the linguistic evidence.” (McGlone, 2001, p. 95) 
 
That is, McGlone considers the relation between the data and the hypotheses to be circular. 
According to his criticism, Lakoff and Johnson obtain one of the hypotheses of the theory (the 
existence of metaphorical concepts) from the data (metaphorical expressions), and then vice 
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versa, they draw inferences related to the behaviour of the data from the hypothesis in 
question. 
However, as it was shown in Kertész and Rákosi (2009), this heuristics does not 
inevitably result in circular argumentation. The reason is that by inferring the existence of 
metaphorical concepts from the use of metaphorical expressions and the use of metaphorical 
expressions from the existence of metaphorical concepts, “one indeed returns to ‘the same 
point’ but does so at a different cognitive level” (Rescher, 1987, p. 119). In particular, the 
difference between the two “cognitive levels” is that whereas one is methodological, the other 
is ontological. When we infer from the use of metaphorical expressions the existence of 
conceptual metaphors, then we are at the methodological level, or rather, in a methodological 
argumentation cycle. In this case, metaphorical expressions are regarded as primary and they 
work as data that serve as the starting point for linguistic theorising in agreement with the 
view according to which in cognitive linguistics “one can move freely and gradually from 
facts about language to facts about human cognition and further on to facts about human life 
generally” (Harder, 1999, p. 196). However, when the peculiarities of metaphorical 
expressions are explained by the existence of conceptual metaphors, then the argumentation 
proceeds at the ontological level, since it is an ontological assumption that metaphorical 
expressions are manifestations of metaphorical concepts, that is, the former are secondary, 
derived phenomena in comparison to the latter. Therefore, this method may be an effective 
heuristics, provided that one can explore more and more aspects of the connection between 
the two levels. To decide whether this is the case, or, rather, whether Lakoff and Johnson’s 
argumentation is circular, further and more subtle considerations are needed.  
According to McGlone, the source of the circularity is that it is solely linguistic data that 
have been applied. This stance presupposes that the use of a single data type leads inevitably 
and automatically to circularity. However, the use of a single data type does not lead 
necessarily to circularity because it is not the case that within a single data type no 
counterexamples against the hypotheses of the theory may appear. The reason why this is so 
is that the hypotheses of the theory have been obtained by inductive inferences in the 
methodological cycles. Therefore, they overgeneralise, i.e. they state more than they are 
allowed to on the basis of the cases examined. Thus, it could happen, for example, that in the 
ontological cycles, one comes across metaphorical expressions that do not display the kind of 
systematicity they should according to the hypothesis of the existence of conceptual 
metaphors. The possibility of conflicts between linguistic data and the hypotheses of the 
theory points towards the non-circular character of Lakoff and Johnson’s argumentation. Such 
a judgement, however, would be overhasty, because Lakoff and Johnson systematically leave 
relevant linguistic data out of consideration; therefore, the testing of their hypotheses has to 
be deemed haphazard. First, there are many literal, non-metaphorical expressions related to 
abstract concepts.1 If we conceptualised arguments with the help of the metaphorical concept 
WAR, then it would not be the case that literal expressions are used to express aspects of the 
concept in question which the metaphor should be capable of explaining. These expressions 
clearly witness that several aspects of the given metaphor are left unexploited, since these are 
not realised in metaphorical expressions. The subsidiary theoretical framework of Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980), however, does not explain why certain aspects of the meaning of abstract 
concepts belong to the “used part” (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 52-53) of a conceptual 
metaphor and why others pertain to the “unused part”. A related problem is that it is not clear 
                                                 
1  For example, in the case of the concept ARGUMENT we have refute, confute, disprove, deny a statement, 
accept a motion, argue, argument, critical response, difference of opinion, assert a statement, establish a 
conclusion, discuss a problem, evidence for, convince somebody, assume an attitude, prove a statement etc. 
 14
why we do not draw faulty “metaphorical entailments”2 concerning the target domain from 
the properties of the source domain, and why we do not draw “metaphorical entailments” that 
would in principle be possible – and consequently, why we do not use related metaphorical 
expressions.3 Second, Lakoff and Johnson do not pay enough attention to linguistic data 
testifying that with respect to abstract concepts, we often use metaphorical expressions which 
– according to the theoretical framework of the conceptual metaphor theory – should belong 
to different conceptual metaphors. From this, it should follow that these concepts were 
conceptualized with the help of more than one source domain, which were not isomorphic 
with each other. In that way, the target domain should have at the same time several 
structures. Accordingly, our thinking and behaviour should be governed (and not only 
influenced) by contradictory principles. Therefore, linguistic data which show that even 
within the boundaries of a single sentence expressions belonging to different metaphorical 
concepts may occur are also problematic. For example, if within the same sentence both of 
the following expressions occurred: discussion group which emphasizes the co-operative 
nature of the argument, and he has defended his position which belongs to the metaphor 
ARGUMENT IS WAR – then we would contradict ourselves. All this testifies that the ability of 
metaphors to influence our thinking and behaviour, if it exists at all, is quite restricted (see 
also Murphy, 1996, p. 184-188; Gentner et al., 2001, p. 207). Third, according to, for 
example, Haser (2005, p. 154), Lakoff and Johnson consider too small a set of metaphorical 
expressions as data insofar as they rely almost solely on familiar conventional metaphors (see 
also Keysar and Bly, 1995; McGlone, 2001, p. 95-96). From this it follows that Lakoff and 
Johnson’s argumentation is circular even with respect to the treatment of linguistic data. 
Although in principle this need not be the case, because the application of a single data type – 
in contrast to McGlone’s view – does not lead automatically to circularity, we have shown 
that the testing of the hypotheses is not systematic, and this prevents the thorough re-
evaluation of the hypotheses of this theoretical framework. 
A further important shortcoming of the treatment of data in Lakoff and Johnson (1980) is 
that, as is well-known, the reference to non-linguistic data remains an empty gesture. 
Although the growing field of psycholinguistic research posed a serious challenge for the 
conceptual metaphor theory, we find neither in Lakoff and Johnson (1980) nor in Lakoff 
(1993) arguments presenting and analysing results of psycholinguistic experiments or data 
stemming from other sources (cf.  Murphy, 1996, p. 183-184; McGlone, 2001, p. 94-98). That 
is, while the preference of a single data type cannot be equated with circularity in the first 
subsidiary framework of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory, in a longer run, taking into 
consideration the development of the theory, the neglect of other relevant data sources is a 
sign of circularity. 
These brief analyses clearly indicate that the first and second subsidiary theoretical 
frameworks of the conceptual metaphor theory, despite their basically non-circular character, 
involve several circular aspects as well. The reason for this is that the argumentation process 
systematically ignores data that should be regarded as relevant, because their inclusion could 
significantly influence the plausibility of the hypotheses of the theory.  
In the nineties, Lakoff and Johnson had to face further criticism on the part of their rivals. 
As a reaction to these attacks, a new subsidiary theoretical framework was put forward in 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999). For instance, in the new subsidiary framework the hypothesis 
about the unidirectionality of metaphorical structuring was supported by arguments from 
neuropsychology. Due to the criticism of property attribution theory and structure mapping 
theory new data types were used (such as evidence from neurology and developmental 
                                                 
2  ‘Metaphorical entailment’ is Lakoff and Johnson’s term, cf. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 91-96). 
3  For similar arguments, see McGlone (2007, p. 114); McGlone (2001, p. 94).   
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psychology); their heuristics and background assumptions were also modified at several 
points.  
We must not forget, however, that linguistic theories are highly complex. Therefore, in 
most cases it is not possible to decide at the outset whether a given theoretical framework 
corresponds to a cyclic argumentation process or to a circular one. First, it may happen that a 
theoretical framework is basically cyclic but includes circular stages as well. Second, the 
verdict on whether the theoretical framework as a whole is cyclic rather than circular or vice 
versa, cannot be based on the analysis of a single stage of its evolution, that is, on the 
examination of a subsidiary theoretical framework but one has to focus on the dynamism of its 
development. Therefore, in order to evaluate a theoretical framework in this respect, careful 
and thorough metatheoretical analyses of all of its subsidiary frameworks are needed. 
Thus, with the evaluation of the new subsidiary framework Lakoff and Johnson (1999), 
we cannot narrow down our investigations to the analysis of the latter. We have to take into 
consideration – besides its predecessor subsidiary frameworks – the fierce criticism which has 
been levelled at the novel subsidiary theoretical framework of Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive 
metaphor theory (cf. Rakova, 2002; Leezenberg, 2001; Haser, 2005; Rohrer, 2006; Geeraerts, 
2006), as well as the reactions of its proponents in order to decide whether it can meet this 
challenge. If it cannot, then its cyclicity will turn into circularity once again. If it can, then 
one may hope that the circularity can be avoided and the cyclic and prismatic argumentation 
process of conceptual metaphor research can be continued in an effective way. 
 
 
4.3. Second example: internal differentiation of the processing models 
 
The problem of circularity was instrumental in elaborating metaphor comprehension models 
associated with Gluckberg’s property attribution theory and Gentner’s structure mapping the-
ory as well. Before Glucksberg’s and Gentner’s work, the field was dominated mainly by 
theoretical frameworks which regarded metaphors as implicit similes. These earlier 
theoretical frameworks inspired the psycholinguistic investigation of metaphors (i.e. the 
standard pragmatic model, cf. Loewenberg, 1975; Searle, 1993; Tversky’s contrast model, cf. 
Tversky, 1977 or Ortony’s salience imbalance model, cf. Ortony, 1979, Ortony et al., 1985). 
 However, these models were circular, since the selection of common features relied on the 
interpretation of the base of the similarity (cf. Glucksberg and McGlone, 2001, p. 30-31).  
These theoretical frameworks have then been replaced, among others, by Glucksberg’s 
and Gentner’s. Since the latter strived to solve a common problem as well (namely, how to 
avoid the circularity of the processing model) and applied similar heuristics, one would 
expect a close similarity in the proposed hypotheses as well. However, this is not the case: the 
experimental data and background assumptions applied by the two theories contradicted each 
other in several respects, and both re-evaluated earlier results from different points of view. 
For example, according to Glucksberg, metaphors were categorical assertions, while in 
Gentner’s opinion they were a specific kind of analogy. Despite this crucial difference, one 
cannot describe the relationship between the two theories as a sharp and stiff opposition or a 
fruitless debate. These controversies inspired the proponents of rival theoretical frameworks 
to develop more and more sophisticated heuristics, that is, psycholinguistic experiments. 
Hence, they tried to obtain new and more reliable data by improving the heuristics applied in 
order to cut the ground from under the critics’ feet and to attack their rivals – but also to 
refine their model. The result was not only the elaboration of more sophisticated subsidiary 
frameworks, but adherents of both approaches came to the insight that there are phenomena 
which cannot be explained by their theory. The experimental data were compatible neither 
with Gluckberg’s, nor with Gentner’s theoretical framework. It is Gentner who has broken 
 16
with the common background assumption of the other theories which state that the process of 
metaphor comprehension can be described by one mechanism only. Instead, she proposes the 
heuristics according to which differences in processing times related to different types of 
metaphors should be interpreted as signs of different modes of metaphor processing (cf. 
Bowdle and Gentner, 2005; Gentner et al., 2001; Gentner and Bowdle, 2008). On the basis of 
this heuristics, she argues for the result that since in the case of novel metaphors, both do-
mains are at the same level of abstraction, i.e. they refer to their literal meaning, we interpret 
them as analogy (that is, as a comparison in which the target concept is structurally aligned 
with the base concept by projection of a series of inferences). In the case of conventional 
metaphors, the base becomes polysemous and both of its meanings (the concrete, literal and 
the abstract, metaphorical) can contribute to the interpretation of the metaphor. Thus, we can 
interpret conventional metaphors as comparisons or as categorical assertions as well, 
depending on the degree of conventionality. This hypothesis is very close to Glucksberg’s 
proposal, although there are some differences as well.  
As regards dead metaphors, she notes that the base has either already lost its primary 
(literal) meaning, or this meaning becomes totally irrelevant, hence such metaphors can be 
interpreted solely as categorization. In sum, according to the career of metaphor hypothesis, 
there is a change in the mode of processing parallel with the increasing conventionality and 
lexicalization. Gentner’s theoretical framework also tries to integrate the finding of Lakoff 
and Johnson’s theoretical framework according to which metaphors are not individual, 
isolated phenomena but create metaphor families (“extended systems of metaphors”).  
Thus, Gentner attempts to integrate the results of the other two theories into hers. She 
collects the open problems, and adopts and improves several of their data and heuristics. The 
acceptance or improvement of these new heuristics can have an immense influence on the 
whole of cognitive metaphor research. In fact, as Keysar et al. (2001) shows, adherents of the 
property attribution theory seem to accept Gentner’s new heuristics, and they also try to 
explain the experimental data along these lines. 
Discrepancies resulting from contradictory empirical data and background assumptions 
must not be equated with unproductive chaos; rather, they pave the way for the revision of the 
theoretical frameworks at issue. As we have seen in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, adherents of the 
theoretical frameworks return to the problems discovered or revealed by rival theories again 
and again, and re-evaluate the earlier decisions about the acceptance or rejection of 
statements, the reliability of the sources, the plausibility values of the statements, the 
workability of methodological norms, the conclusions previously reached by inferences etc. 
In sum: they retrospectively re-evaluate the information at issue (cf. Rescher, 1976, 1987; 
Kertész and Rákosi, 2009, 2012), elaborating new subsidiary frameworks. This successive re-
evaluation is initiated by considering new sources, new statements, new methods etc., and it 
leads to the elaboration of possible solutions to the problems. This process is basically not 
linear, because the re-evaluation of the information may raise new problems and need not lead 
immediately to the solution of ones raised earlier.4 This may require the revision of previous 
decisions, the assessment of further alternatives, and the evaluation and comparison of the 
alternative solutions. To sum up, retrospective re-evaluation is cyclic in nature. However, it is 
not only cyclic, it is also prismatic. This means that the cycles continuously change the 
perspective from which the pieces of information constituting the context are evaluated (cf. 
Rescher, 1987). Although different theoretical frameworks adopt basically different 
perspectives, they may (and should) look at the data, problems, heuristics and results from the 
rival’s perspective, too. In this way, they can contribute to the development of the subsidiary 
research framework of cognitive metaphor research by (partial) cooperation as well.   
                                                 
4  For a considerably more precise description of this process see Kertész and Rákosi (2009, 2012). 
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4.4. Third example: The demand for the combination of data and methods  
 
Since language in cognitive science is treated as an integral part of cognition, it is 
commonplace in cognitive linguistics that the exploration of language in cognitive linguistics 
should be carried out in close cooperation with research in other cognitive disciplines. In the 
present context, this elementary methodological requirement means that investigations within 
the subsidiary research framework of the cognitive theory of metaphor should be carried out 
with respect to related research in cognitive science. Therefore, it is a fundamental question 
which data and methods from which branch of cognitive science can or should be combined 
with each other in order to discover the mental foundations of linguistic metaphors.5 
Although all three theoretical frameworks outlined above (Lakoff and Johnson, 
Glucksberg, Gentner) are committed to the research framework of cognitive science, their 
relationship to the combination of methods and data is problematic insofar as they make use 
of only one kind of heuristics and data. The theoretical framework of Lakoff and Johnson 
(based on Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1993) is methodologically a genuine linguistic program. 
It makes use of the introspective-intuitive method and metalinguistic intuition as a source of 
data.6 The approaches of Gentner and Glucksberg are basically psychologically oriented and 
they use first and foremost psycholinguistic experiments as heuristics. Therefore, there seems 
to be a tension between the principle of cognitive commitment and the preference for a single 
data type and heuristic in research practice. From this, the question of possible extensions of 
the range of the applied data sources and heuristics and their combination by the three 
theoretical frameworks emerges. 
This problem is a hot topic today. The main reason for this is that the introspective-
intuitive method of data collection technique as a principal heuristics was fiercely criticised 
by the rival theoretical frameworks mainly on the ground that it is unreliable, since it is 
subjective and can be influenced by many factors. Therefore, it is a serious challenge for 
cognitive metaphor research whether and how these problems can be solved. Adherents of 
Lakoff and Johnson’s theoretical framework tried to respond to criticism levelled by 
psycholinguists (cf. e.g., Murphy, 1996, 1997; Glucksberg and McGlone, 2001; Keysar et al., 
2000; Gentner et al., 2001; Gentner and Bowdle, 2008) in such a way that they partially re-
evaluated the data base and the heuristics (data-handling techniques) of the subsidiary 
theoretical framework Lakoff and Johnson (1980). As we will see, the following sources of 
data and heuristics have been suggested in current literature on cognitive research into 
metaphor: (i) metalinguistic intuition, (ii) corpus linguistic procedures and linguistic corpora, 
and (iii) psycholinguistic experiments and their results.  
Proponents of the theoretical framework of Lakoff and Johnson basically followed two 
strategies in order to avoid problems arising from the overestimation of metalinguistic 
intuition:  
Followers of the first strategy do not deny the merits of psycholinguistic data and 
heuristics, but they seem to think that testing the results of linguistic analyses falls outside 
their research field. Therefore, they propose different linguistic methods and/or data types 
which could allow the elimination of factors responsible for the unreliability of introspective 
data.7 In current literature, there are three main versions of this strategy:8  
                                                 
5  Cf. Sanders (1997) for an overview of the state of the art in the 90’s and Gibbs (2006, 2008) for the present. 
6  Gibbs’ research activity could be mentioned as an exception, but even his approach is not without problems, 
as we will see in this section. 
7  This is of course a competence problem, too. Ted Sanders noticed at an ICLA conference in the early 90’s 
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(i) One group of researchers argues for the explication of the introspective-intuitive 
method and its combination with other linguistic methods in order to arrive at a transparent 
and controllable procedure of data collection (Jäkel, 1997; Steen, 1999, 2007). Steen’s 
approach, for example, can be considered as an attempt to explicate the introspective-intuitive 
method of data collection, allowing for the analysis of single metaphors. However, it still 
involves subjective and intuitive elements. Therefore, it cannot be regarded as a brand-new 
heuristics initiating a new subsidiary theoretical framework of the theory of Lakoff and 
Johnson. Other aspects of the framework also remain untouched by Steen’s proposal. He 
concentrates solely on the explication of the introspective-intuitive method, so the problems 
concerning the absolute preference of linguistic data remain open. 
(ii) There are metaphor researchers as well who think that the introspective-intuitive 
method can be controlled with the help of special linguistic procedures, i.e. by corpus 
linguistic methods. Therefore, they propose the combination of the introspective-intuitive 
method with corpus-based approaches and corpus data in order to solve the problem of the 
reliability of the results (cf. Deignan, 1999, 2008).  
(iii) Some linguists want to eliminate the introspective-intuitive method totally 
(Stefanowitsch, 2006). They try to replace it by supposedly much more reliable data 
collection procedures, i.e. by corpus-based methods. Nevertheless, these radical views rest 
inevitably on metalinguistic intuition right at the outset and the evaluation of the results 
contains subjective elements, too (cf. Csatár, 2009, p. 38-41; Deignan, 1999, p. 180; 
Stefanowitsch and Gries (Eds.), 2007; Kertész and Rákosi, 2008). 
 
In sum, the approaches mentioned above react to the problem of the reliability of the applied 
data and heuristics with the help of the application of new linguistic methods and linguistic 
data. They want to arrive at a renewed methodology by strengthening the linguistic base of 
cognitive metaphor research. In this way, however, the overestimation of linguistic heuristics 
and of the type of data, which is at the heart of the criticism put forward by the proponents of 
the rival theories, is not touched on by these approaches at all. They neither provide solutions 
to the problems raised by the rival theoretical frameworks (cf. e.g., Sections 4.2-3), nor do 
they answer criticism that could be directed against the heuristics and the data applied in 
corpus linguistics in general (Cf. Stefanowitsch and Gries (Eds.), 2007). 
Some adherents of Lakoff and Johnson’s theoretical framework follow a second strategy. 
Instead of elaborating a linguistically rooted course in order to renew the heuristics of the 
classical theoretical framework, their investigations are based on the combination of 
introspective-intuitive data with results of psycholinguistic experiments. Thus, as a 
consequence of the debates on the empirical foundations of Lakoff and Johnson’s theoretical 
framework (cf. Murphy vs. Gibbs in Cognition, 1996, 1997) and the considerable success of 
rival theoretical frameworks (Glucksberg, 2001; Gentner, 1997; Bowdle and Gentner, 2005) a 
new direction has evolved: psycholinguistic research of conceptual metaphors (Gibbs, 2006, 
2008). 
Psycholinguists argue for the combination of linguistic and experimental evidence in 
order to solve the problem of the reliability and the overestimation of linguistic data: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
that “a prominent cognitive linguist said: ‘Sure, I think my theory could be tested in language processing, but I 
don’t know how. That’s other people’s job.’” (Sanders, 1997, p. 247). But even Sanders is of the opinion that 
psycholinguistic research is a basic source for reviewing cognitive linguistic analyses: “I consider it worthwhile 
to have a look at existing methods in psycholinguistics, to at least get some idea of possible manners to test 
linguistic theories.” (Sanders, 1997, p. 248)  
8  The problems related to the introspective-intuitive data collection techniques and metalinguistic intuition 
have been discussed in greater detail in Csatár (2009). 
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“[...] linguistic metaphors should be treated as a source of hypotheses about the structure 
of abstract concepts. Evaluating these hypotheses – determining when a linguistic 
metaphor reflects an underlying conceptual metaphor – requires both linguistic and extra-
linguistic methods, and calls for cooperation across disciplines of the cognitive sciences.” 
(Casasanto, 2009, p. 143; emphasis as in the original) 
 
Psycholinguistic experiments, however, do not lead to certainly true results, either. First, they 
rely on subjective factors, too, for example, in connection with the judgement of 
metaphoricity, the degree of conventionality, etc. while elaborating the stimulus material. 
Therefore, psycholinguists are not in a position to ignore the problems of metalinguistic 
intuition. Second, several studies indicate that in spite of the application of measuring 
methods, we can find contradictory results related to the same topic. That is, some metaphor 
experiments came to mutually opposed results, for instance, on spatialising time in language 
and thought (cf. Casasanto, 2009, p. 130-131). Third, the problem of reproducibility indicates 
the same problem, for some of the experimental results could not be reproduced. Szamarasz 
repeated classic time-experiments (Boroditsky, 2000; Boroditsky and Ramscar, 2002) with 
Hungarian speakers, but her results yielded disparate results (cf. Szamarasz, 2006). Csatár, 
Pethő and Tóth tried to reproduce the results of an experiment of Gibbs (2002) on identifying 
and appreciating poetic metaphors, but the results were very divergent (cf. Csatár et al., 
2006). 
A further serious problem related to the experiments in favour of the theoretical 
framework of Lakoff and Johnson is that in most cases the authors do not aim at refuting the 
results of the rival theoretical frameworks. That is, they – unlike their rivals’ adherents – do 
not try to identify the shortcomings of the experimental design applied by their critics and to 
elaborate more sophisticated and more reliable variants of their experiments. 
To sum up, we can say that there seems to be a tremendous but yet unrealised and 
unexploited potential in the extension of the set of data types, the combination of different 
data types and the related methods. First, the combination of different data types may provide 
stronger evidence for a hypothesis than any of them alone. Second, the uncertainty resulting 
from the application of a single data type can be reduced by the combination of more data 
types and methods. Third, contradictions between hypotheses based on different data types 
require the re-evaluation of the hypotheses, methods etc., and with this, they contribute to the 
development of the given theoretical framework.9  
 
 
4.5. The solution to (P1) 
 
(H1) The metatheoretical approach to cognitive metaphor research as outlined above and 
summarised in (H2) and (H3), provides a plausible point of departure for capturing the 
following aspects of data in cognitive metaphor research: 
 
(a) the interaction of different theoretical frameworks,  
(b) as a result of this, the revision of data processing methods in the light of other 
theoretical frameworks, 
(c) the retrospective re-evaluation process of data and data processing techniques 
which is at the heart of these mechanisms, 
(d) the relationship between problems, heuristics and data. 
 
                                                 
9  For more on this, see Kertész and Rákosi (2012). 
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Nevertheless, (H1) is the starting point, rather than the final result of applying the 
metatheoretical approach we have sketched to the data problem in cognitive metaphor 
research. To reveal the details and to check to what extent it is workable, there is a long way 
to go. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
However simplified and concise the application of our metascientific model to cognitive 
metaphor research has been, it has illustrated the assumption that the continuous re-evaluation 
of problems, data, the heuristics employed and the results is not solely an outcome of the 
internal change of the theoretical framework at issue, but rather, stems from the stimuli 
coming from other theoretical frameworks belonging to the same research framework.  
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